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During the Great Moderation, borrowing by the U.S. nonfinancial sectors structurally exceeded 
GDP growth. Using flow-of-fund data, we test the hypothesis that this measure of debt buildup was 
leading to lower output volatility. We estimate univariate GARCH models in order to obtain 
estimates for the volatility of output growth. We estimate a VAR model over two periods, 1954-
1978 (before the Great Moderation) and 1984-2008 (during the Great Moderation). We test whether 
the relation between credit growth and GDP volatility changed between the two periods, controlling 
for the stance of monetary policy, for inflation, and for the endogeneity of credit to growth. Results 
from Granger causality tests, impulse response functions, forecast error variance decompositions 
and a counterfactual simulation suggest that credit growth in the nonfinancial sectors in excess of 
output growth was among the causal factors of the decline in output volatility during the Great 
Moderation. We discuss implications. 
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JEL codes: E44, C32, C51, C52 
                                                           
∗
 E-mail addresses: d.j.bezemer@rug.nl (Dirk Bezemer, corresponding author) and maria.grydaki@stir.ac.uk (Maria 
Grydaki). We thank Wouter den Haan for making the data available and participants at seminars at the Utrecht School 
of Economics, Groningen University, the 17th International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International 
Finance in Rethymno, the 1st International PhD Meeting in Economics in Thessaloniki, and the 28th Annual Congress of 
the European Economic Association in Gotheborg. Their helpful remarks improved earlier version of this paper. The 
Institute for New Economic Thinking generously supported this work under grant INO11-00053. Any errors are ours. 
2 
 




This paper finds that credit growth in the nonfinancial sectors in excess of output growth was 
among the causal factors of the decline in output volatility during the Great Moderation. In the mid-
1980s, two shifts occurred in the US economy. The first was that borrowing by the nonfinancial 
sectors increased strongly within a few years, to a level that was structurally above the level of 
growth. It remained high for over two decades, until the 2007 crisis.  The second was that 
macroeconomic volatility declined strongly within a few years.1 This ‘Great Moderation’ lasted for 
more than two decades, until the 2007 crisis. Access to credit may decrease output fluctuations 
since “credit demand appears to contain a significant countercyclical component, which arises from 
the desire of households and firms to smooth the impact of cyclical variations in income on 
spending or production” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995:44). 
In this paper we pursue this explanation. We use the ‘Z’ tables of the U.S. flow of funds 
statistics to observe borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors in excess of growth. We so obtain a 
measure for the growth in indebtedness of the nonfinancial sectors at the macro level, which we link 
to output volatility at the macro level. We hypothesize that the growth in this ‘excess’ credit growth 
in the nonfinancial sectors was among the Granger-causal factors of the lower volatility of output 
during the Great Moderation. It bears emphasis that we test for Granger causation, which  implies 
that “ [t]he cause contains information about the effect that is unique, and is in no other variable is 
informative on sequence in time, rather than  “true causality”, as Granger himself mentioned in his 
Nobel speech in 2003 (Granger, 2003) 2. Our hypothesis is related to a number of financial-sector 
explanations of the Great Moderation, and consistent with a wider literature on credit and macro 
volatility. But we break new ground in two areas. 
                                                           
1
 The Great Moderation era saw declines in the volatility of a number of macroeconomic variables in the U.S., as in 
many other countries (Bernanke, 2004; Cecchetti and Krause, 2006; Ćorić, 2012). The standard deviation of U.S. 
quarterly growth and inflation declined by half and by two thirds since 1984, respectively (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; 
Carlstrom et al., 2009). Stock and Watson (2002) find that the standard deviation of U.S. GDP growth declined from 
2.6-2.7% in the 1970s and 1980s to 1.5% in the 1990s. Also employment volatility strongly declined (Kim and Nelson, 
1999; Warnock and Warnock, 2000). 
2
 Granger continued to say that “ [a]t that time, I had little idea that so many people had very fixed ideas about 
causation, but they did agree that my definition was not “true causation” in their eyes, it was only “Granger causation”. I 
would ask for a definition of true causation, but no one would reply.”  (Granger, 2003:366). 
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First, no study to date has directly analyzed the link between output volatility during the Great 
Moderation and borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors - that is, excluding borrowing for investment 
in the ‘finance, insurance and real estate’ sectors (or ‘FIRE’ sectors, in the classification of the 
National Income and Product Accounts). A number of studies have focused on FIRE-sector wealth 
buildup resulting from financial innovations and its possible effect on output volatility moderation, 
through a wealth effect on income (e.g. Den Haan and Sterk, 2011). The channel through which 
debt-financed wealth accumulation affects output volatility is different from the effect of debt-
financed activity, which we analyze. 
A second contribution is that we observe not just credit flows (as other studies do), but the 
growth in borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors in excess of output growth. We so focus on the 
growth in the debt-to-GDP ratio that is due to borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors. This goes 
beyond simply testing for the effect of credit on volatility. Other studies have shown that credit 
flows to the nonfinancial sectors normally move together with output growth (Biggs et al., 2010; 
Board, 2012), and that credit moderates industrial output volatility (Larrain, 2006). A special feature 
of the Great Moderation was that growth in credit flows to the nonfinancial sectors structurally 
exceeded nominal GDP growth (as we show in the next section) -  even when excluding the growth 
in credit to finance, insurance and real estate (i.e. not to the nonfinancial sectors), where most of the 
credit growth was occurring. Plausibly, credit growth in the nonfinancial sectors has a more direct 
impact on output volatility. This has not been analyzed to date. 
Our empirical approach is to first estimate the conditional standard deviation of output growth. 
Using this obtained measure for output volatility, we then estimate a number of reduced-form VAR 
models for quarterly data over 1984Q1-2008Q1 (the results are robust to variations in the time 
bounds of the Great Moderation). We examine lags of excess credit growth in a system of equations 
with (obtained) real output growth volatility, the inflation rate and the federal funds rate. We find 
robust evidence that the increased growth of borrowing beyond GDP growth was a Granger-causal 
factor in the greater macroeconomic tranquility that characterized the Great Moderation. We then 
ask if this was also the case before the Great Moderation. In an analysis of a 1954Q3-1978Q4 
sample (i.e. one which ends well before the earliest dating of the Great Moderation), we fail to find 
Granger causality between ‘excess’ credit growth and output volatility. This may be either because 
excess credit growth was much smaller before the Great Moderation, as we document, or because 
the dependence of output volatility on excess credit growth was lower. In either case, there is 
evidence that the rate of borrowing in the nonfinancial sectors beyond GDP growth was a Granger-
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causal factor in greater macroeconomic tranquility of the Great Moderation, which it was not 
before. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents trends in U.S. credit market 
instruments and in output growth. In section 3 we make connections to the literature. In section 4 
we present the methodology. Section 5 presents the data and reports results. Section 6 concludes 
with a summary, reflections and suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Postwar Trends in the U.S. Credit Market Lending 
 
Figure 1 shows the long-term development of the growth in credit in the U.S.  The stock of credit 
(comprising both bank and nonbank lending) relative to GDP quadrupled from 1952 to 2008. Most 
of that growth occurred during the Great Moderation and credit flows to the finance, insurance and 
real estate sectors accounted for most of the increase.3 Also credit to the nonfinancial sectors (that 
is, credit to nonfinancial business, to government and nonmortgage credit to households) rose 
strongly during the Great Moderation: from 87% of GDP in 1952 to 99% in 1984 and to 143% of 
GDP in 2008. This implies a more than threefold rise in the annual growth rate of the (nonfinancial-
sectors) credit-to-GDP ratio, from 0.4% in 1952-1983 to 1.4% annually over 1984-2008. Figure 2 
plots the growth in credit to the nonfinancial sectors and the growth in nominal GDP. We compute 
the difference between the two growth rates and label this variable “excess credit growth”. 
 
[Figure 1 HERE] 
[Figure 2 HERE] 
 
The Federal Reserve notes in its ‘Guide to the Flow of Funds’ that “over long periods of time there 
has been a fairly close relationship between the growth of debt of the nonfinancial sectors and 
aggregate economic activity” (Board, 2012:176). The growth in nonfinancial sectors borrowing 
creates purchasing power which adds proportionally to GDP, because “loans cause deposits and 
those deposits cause an expansion of GDP transactions” -  at least if those deposits are expended on 
goods and services rather than assets (Caporale and Howells, 2001; also Minsky, 1982; Levine, 
2004; Ang, 2008). This is apparent in the flat part of the graph in Figure 1 on the left, before the 
Great Moderation. In contrast, around the start of the Great Moderation, the growth in the stock of 
                                                           
3
 By the end of the Great Moderation, credit to the finance, insurance and real estate sectors had increased from 30% of 
GDP in 1952 (the start of the data series) to 81% of GDP in 1984, to 260% of GDP in 2008. Most of this rise, in turn, 
was due to growth in mortgage debt. After the Great Moderation, FIRE-sector debt dropped sharply relative to GDP. 
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credit to the nonfinancial sectors exceeds the growth in nominal GDP so that their ratio rose. The 
difference, which remained positive for most of the Great Moderation,  indicates borrowing which 
is (by definition) not itself expended on domestic goods and services - if it was, this would have 
raised GDP growth to the level of credit growth. 
Figure 3 plots the cumulative difference between the growth rates of nominal GDP and credit 
to the nonfinancial sectors. This “excess credit growth” cumulation was mostly negative between 
1952 and 1970, when the economy was growing faster, on average, than the growth of lending to 
the nonfinancial sectors. Through the 1970s cumulative “excess credit growth” remained at a 
positive but fairly constant and low level. It took off in the early 1980s and remained high (and 
increasing in most years) during the Great Moderation. 
 
[Figure 3 HERE] 
 
There are several possible ways in which the nonfinancial sectors’ debt growth can rise above GDP 
growth, and so deviate from the long-term parity noted in the Flow of Funds guide – for instance, 
trends in net financial asset acquisition or in debt-financed imports. Whether or not these or other 
channels operated is not the focus of this paper, and we relegate a brief discussion of possible 
channels to Appendix B. In any case, an increase in borrowing relative to output may decrease 
output fluctuations since it allows “households and firms to smooth the impact of cyclical variations 
in income on spending or production” (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995:44). This is also suggested by, 
for instance, Davis and Kahn (2008) who find that an important part of the decline in macro 
volatility is explained by changes in aggregate volatility in the durable goods sector, but without a 
decline in the uncertainty of incomes. This is understandable if part of durable goods consumption 
was financed with debt, not income. Their finding is consistent with the greater credit availability 
that was typical of the Great Moderation (as also Dynan et al., 2006 document), which would also 
have the effect of loosening the link between the dynamics of income and consumption. 
 
3. Connections to the Literature 
 
That credit stabilizes output is no new finding. We already noted studies by Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995) on the countercyclical tendency of consumer credit and by Larrain (2006) on the stabilizing 
properties of credit with respect to industrial output. Iacoviello (2005) estimates a monetary 
business cycle model with nominal loans and finds that “nominal debt dampens supply shocks, 
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stabilizing the economy under interest rate control” (Iacoviello, 2005:739). Jermann and Quadrini 
(2006) similarly show in a general equilibrium model how innovations in financial markets can 
generate a lower volatility of output, together with a higher volatility in the financial structure of 
firms. “Credit View” literature (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Bernanke, 1993; Bernanke and 
Gertler, 1995) and accelerator models (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Campbell, 2005) theorize how 
the credit system may either amplify or dampen exogenous shocks.  A broader strand of literature 
connects credit conditions to the business cycle and the economy’s volatility (e.g. Bliss and 
Kaufmann, 2003; Mendicino, 2007), making the general point that financial development tends to 
stabilize growth (Easterly et al., 2000). 
It is therefore unsurprising that among the many explanations of the Great Moderation, a good 
number involve the financial sector.4 Financial innovations and deregulations of lending practices 
and loan markets during the Great Moderation such as relaxed collateral constraints, lower down 
payments, and lower rates of amortization for durable goods purchases on household borrowing 
(Campbell and Hercowitz, 2005) affected consumer spending, housing investment, and business 
fixed investment (Dynan et al. (2006). Guerron-Quintana (2009) develops a model of the demand 
for money with portfolio adjustments to suggest that the Great Moderation can be partially 
attributed to financial innovations in the late 1970s. His model accounts for almost one-third of the 
observed decline in the volatilities of output, consumption, and investment.  
The present paper is consistent with each of these finance-driven accounts of the Great 
Moderation (which operated in conjunction with other, nonfinancial factors, to be sure). What it 
adds is a focus on growth of debt relative to output, and which was connected to nonfinancial-
sectors activity, rather than to asset and property markets (as in Den Haan and Sterk, 2011). The 
testable implication we suggest is that there was Granger causality from this ‘excess credit growth’ 
measure to the volatility of output growth during the Great Moderation, different from the pre-
Great Moderation years. Note that this may be either because before the Great Moderation excess 
                                                           
4
 Research has identified as possible causes for the Great Moderation better inventory management (McConnell and 
Perez-Quiros, 2000; Kahn et al., 2002; McCarthy and Zakrajsek, 2007), labor market changes and demography 
(Jaimovic and Siu, 2009), oil shocks (Nakov and Pescatori, 2010), changed responses to those and other shocks 
(Gambetti et al., 2008) or broader factors such as institutions (Acemoglou et al., 2003; Owyang et al. (2007), external 
balances (Fogli and Perri, 2006), the size of the economy (Canning et al., 1998), and development levels (Acemoglu and 
Zilibotti, 1997; Easterly et al., 1993)- or simply to “good luck” (Ahmed et al., 2002; Cogley and Sargent, 2005; 
Primiceri, 2005; Sims and Zha, 2006; Benati, 2008; Gambetti et al., 2008; Benati and Surico, 2009). Part of the 
moderation in output volatility may be also be due to changing responses to monetary shocks (Clarida et al., 2000) and 
improvements in monetary policy (Bernanke, 2004; Lubik and Schorfheide, 2003; Boivin and Giannoni, 2006; Akram 
and Eitrheim, 2008). 
7 
 
credit growth was much smaller (Figure 2), or because the dependence of output volatility on excess 





Output growth volatility may be measured by the conditional variance estimated in univariate or 
multivariate GARCH models (Bollerslev, 1986 based on Engle’s (1982) ARCH model; Engle and 
Kroner, 1995).5 To obtain volatility estimates, we first test for the existence of ARCH effects (i.e. 
volatility clustering), which causes volatility levels to correlate positively over time and suggest the 
estimation of an ARCH(p) model (Engle, 1982). The conditional mean equation is then: 




t h t h t t t t
h
y y , | ~ N ,µ ϕ ε ε ψ σ
− −
=
= + +∑                                                                (1) 
where, yt, µ,φh, εt are vectors of the dependent variable, intercept, autoregressive term and the 
innovation vector, respectively, and ψt-1 is the information set at time t-1. Given an estimate for the 
conditional mean, this allows us to obtain the conditional variance in the equation:   





t i t i
i
σ α α ε
−
=
= +∑                                                                                                     (2) 
where 2tσ  is the conditional variance, 0α  the intercept and αi  the ARCH terms of the variance 
equation (with 1,..., ,=i p ). The estimated variance should be positive; therefore we impose 0 0α >  









Given the existence of ARCH effects, it is often useful to estimate the more parsimonious 
GARCH model (Bollerslev, 1986) which allows for a flexible lag structure. A GARCH(p,q) model 
accommodates autoregressive as well as moving-average components in the heteroskedastic 
variance. The equation for heteroskedastic variance which replaces equation (2) is then: 





t i t i j t j
i j
σ α α ε β σ
− −
= =
= + +∑ ∑                                                                                 (3) 
                                                           
5
 An analytical survey of multivariate GARCH models is in Bauwens et al. (2006).  
6
 Nelson and Cao (1992) provide analytically the inequality constraints for univariate GARCH models. 
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+ <∑ ∑  for 
1i ≥
 and 1j ≥ . 
Because of the squared lagged error term in equation (3), the conditional variance is a function 
of the magnitudes of lagged residuals, but not of their signs (symmetric response of volatility to 
positive and negative shocks). In reality, a negative shock (“bad” news) tends to increase volatility 
more than a positive shock (“good” news) of the same magnitude, especially in financial time 
series. Accounting for this asymmetric responses (or ‘leverage effect’), we estimate two asymmetric 
specifications for the conditional variance, both widely used. The first is the Exponential GARCH 
(EGARCH) model (Nelson, 1991) which does not require non-negativity constraints: 
( ) ( ) ( )2 20
1 1 1
q p r
t j t j i t i t i k t k t k
j i k
ln lnσ α β σ α ε σ λ ε σ
− − − − −
= = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑                                          (4) 
In equation (4), the conditional variance is in log-linear form. So regardless of the magnitude of 
( )2tln σ , the implied value of 2tσ  is non-negative. It is therefore possible for the coefficients to take 
negative values. Also, instead of using the value of 2t iε −  as in equation (3) the EGARCH model uses 
the standardized value of t iε − . This allows for a more natural interpretation of the size and 
persistence of shocks (Nelson, 1991). A third advantage of the EGARCH model is that it allows for 
leverage effects, as noted. These effects occur if 0kλ < . 
Another option is to estimate a general form of the Threshold ARCH model (Zakoian, 1994), 
which is the Threshold GARCH (or TGARCH) model (Glosten et al., 1993). The TGARCH model 
has an additional term accounting for possible asymmetries. The conditional variance is now given 
by: 




t i t i j t j k t k t k
i j k
dσ α α ε β σ γ ε
− − − −
= = =
= + + +∑ ∑ ∑                                                                    (5) 
Here we impose the non-negativity constraints: 0
1 1
0, 0,  0,  and 0.
p r
i j i k
i k
α α β α γ
= =
≥ ≥ ≥ + ≥∑ ∑  In 
equation (5), t kd −  is a dummy variable which is equal to one if 0t kε − <  and equal to zero if 
0t kε − ≥ . This ensures that if 0kγ > , then negative shocks will have larger effects on volatility than 




Once we obtain an estimate for output volatility (i.e. the conditional standard deviation), we 
move on to the aim of this paper, which is to analyze Granger causality between output volatility 
and other variables in a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model. Since we have no prior on causality, 
all variables are treated as endogenous, allowing the value of a variable to depend on its own lags 
and on the lags of all the other variables in the model. The VAR specification is:
 
         0 1 1 ...− −= Α + Α + + Α +t t p t p ty y y ε                                                                             (6)  
where yt  is an (n x 1) vector with the n variables included in the VAR (endogenous variables), A0 
reflects an (n x 1) vector of intercept terms, Ai  denote (n x n) matrices of coefficients (with i=1,…p) 
and εt is an (n x 1) vector of error terms. 
We then conduct Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) and estimate impulse response 
functions (IRFs). IRFs represent the moving average evolution of the system, describing how one 
variable responds to a shock to itself or other variables. Sims (1980) suggests that examining IRFs 
might be the most effective way of exploring Granger causality in multivariate frameworks.7 
Another way to do this is to characterize the dynamic behavior of the VAR in a forecast error 
variance decomposition analysis. And third, we present a counterfactual analysis.  
 
 
5. Data and Empirical Results 
 
We use quarterly data for the U.S. over two subsamples, 1954Q3-1978Q4 (before the Great 
Moderation) and 1984Q1-2008Q1 (during the Great Moderation).8 We calculated the logarithm of 
real GDP (RGDP) and as control variables we include the Federal funds rates (FR) – which is 
                                                           
7
 Note that while Granger causation is not identical to economic causation - especially not in the case of forward-
looking agents taking out credit -it is one of the ways to assess evidence for economic causation which is open to us in 
the context of this model. We compute orthogonalized impulse responses using Cholesky decompositions (Sims, 1980). 
IRFs trace the effect of a 1 standard deviation shock to one of the innovations (error terms) on current and future values 
of the endogenous variables. A shock to the ith variable is so transmitted to the other endogenous variables in the VAR 
system as well as the ith variable itself.  
8
 We applied the Chow test for structural breaks over the whole period 1954Q3-2008Q1 and found that any quarter in 
1980Q1-1983Q4 is a potential breakpoint in output volatility. This is consistent with Boivin and Giannoni (2006) who 
report that there is no robust breakpoint at which the Great Moderation would have started. Fang and Miller (2008) 
show that the time-varying variance of output falls sharply or even disappears once they incorporate a one-time 
structural break in the unconditional variance of output starting 1982 or 1984. The literature uses any year between the 
late 1970s and 1984 at the latest. To test sensitivity to choice of break point, we chose 1981Q2 as alternative breakpoint 
and we re-estimated the VAR. The results are similar to those obtained for the periods 1954Q3-1978Q4 and 1984Q1-
2008Q1 and are available upon request. 
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stationary in first difference (I(1)) - and inflation (INF), measured by the real GDP deflator.9 Our 
fourth variable is excess credit growth (EXCRED), the difference between the growth rates of 
nominal credit to the nonfinancial sectors and of nominal output. We refer to Appendix A for details 
of the construction of EXCRED. With these four variables in a VAR framework, we control for the 
stance of monetary policy, for inflation, and for the endogeneity of credit to growth (as well as for 
other endogeneities).  
After testing for stationarity, we examine the presence of ARCH effects (clustered volatility) by 
conducting the ARCH Lagrange Multiplier (ARCH-LM) test, for 1 to 12 lags (Engle, 1982). Table 
1 reports descriptive statistics and values of the ARCH-LM statistic for the two subsamples. 
 
[Table 1 HERE] 
 
All variables have positive growth rates (differenced logs) on average. All variables tend to be more 
volatile before the beginning of the Great Moderation than during the Great Moderation. The 
distribution of inflation exhibits positive skewness with few high values in both subsamples; the 
opposite holds for the remaining variables. Further, the kurtosis (or “peakedness”) statistics for the 
distributions of all the variables show more deviations from the normal distribution in the first 
subsample than in the second. The ARCH-LM test shows that evidence of ARCH effects in the 
squares of real output growth rate in both subsamples.10  
We estimate four (symmetric and asymmetric) GARCH models in order to obtain the 
conditional standard deviation of RGDP, accounting for autoregressive terms (see equations 1-5). 
Given the skewness and kurtosis of the log difference of RGDP, we assume that the error term of 
equation (1) is t-student distributed. The parameters of the univariate GARCH models are therefore 
estimated by maximizing the log-likelihood function: 
                                                           
9
 We thank Wouter den Haan for making the data available; see Den Haan and Sterk (2011). We apply the following 
stationarity tests to the logs of the variables: (i) Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) (Kwiatkowski et al., 
1992), (ii) Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and (iii) Phillips and Perron (PP) (Phillips and 
Perron, 1988). For tests (i) and (iii), the lag length was selected by the kernel-based estimator of the frequency zero 
spectrum, which is based on a weighted sum of the covariances. For test (ii) the selection of the number of lags in the 
test equations is according to the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). Stationarity is tested at 1%, 5%, 10% 
significance levels and the time trend has been taken into account in the test equation. Unit root test results are available 
on request. 
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where Γ(.) is the gamma function and v is the degree of freedom (v>2). The log-likelihood function 
for the conditional t distribution converges to the log-likelihood function of the conditional normal 
GARCH model as v → ∞ . 
We first select the models which meets the non-negativity constraints and stationarity 
conditions (in the symmetric GARCH models), and/or which support the existence of leverage or 
threshold effect (in the asymmetric GARCH models). Table 2 reports the three AR-GARCH models 
that pass the above tests. From this subset, the preferred GARCH model is selected according to the 
minimum value of the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC).11 The SIC value indicates that the 
conditional variance of output growth (and subsequently the conditional standard deviation) is best 
captured by a symmetric GARCH model - specifically, the AR(2)-GARCH(1,1).12 The Ljung-Box 
statistic indicates that the estimated model is well-specified once it does not suffer from remaining 
autocorrelation (Q(p)) and remaining ARCH effects (Q2(p)). 
 
[Table 2 HERE] 
 
Having obtained the conditional standard deviation estimates for the volatility of real output growth, 
we then estimate a number of reduced-form VAR models on quarterly data for the two subsamples 
1954Q3-1978Q4 and 1984Q1-2008Q1. We examine whether lags of excess credit growth 
(EXCRED) matter to the volatility of real output growth (denoted σdlrgdp). Other variables in the 
system are the inflation rate (INF) and the federal funds rates (FR), as in Den Haan and Sterk 
(2011). We estimate VAR(p) models with p=1,…12. The model selection criterion is again the 
minimum SIC value.13 This procedure yields a VAR(1) model for both subsamples.14 To examine 
                                                           
11
 We used 1-12 lags for the estimation of the AR(p)-(A)Symmetric GARCH models. Three models meet the criteria of 
nonnegativity constraints on the conditional variance coefficients (apart from EGARCH model for which such 
restrictions are not necessary) and residual diagnostics of no remaining ARCH effects and remaining autocorrelation. 
The coefficient  λ1 in the AR(2)-EGARCH(1,1) model, which reflects the asymmetric effect on the conditional 
variance, is negative supporting the existence of leverage effect. The coefficient γ1 in the AR(2)-TGARCH(1,1) model 
denotes the asymmetric term in the conditional variance and the positive sign reflects that negative shocks will have 
larger effects on volatility that positive shocks. 
12
 Several conditional variance specifications have been estimated and the GARCH(1,1) performs better.  
13
 We estimated the VAR including also output growth. The results do not change qualitatively and are available upon 
request. We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  
14
 Although the lag order of the VAR is short, the dynamic behavior of the variables can be captured sufficiently in the 
first subsample. We tried also VAR(2) as indicated by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC); the qualitative results do not 
change. In the second subsample VAR(1) is indicated by both information criteria. 
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the causal effects of the variables under investigation, we conduct Granger causality tests, reported 
in Table 3. 
 
 [Table 3 HERE] 
 
We find that interest rates were more responsive to inflation during the Great Moderation than was 
the case before. This plausibly reflects the adoption of inflation targets in monetary policy. Interest 
rates themselves exhibit bidirectional causality with output volatility in the Great Moderation, and 
unidirectional causality (from interest rates to output volatility) before. Also, we find Granger 
causality from excess credit growth to changes in interest rate in both subsamples. As to our 
hypothesis, the first two rows of Table 3 show unidirectional causality from excess credit growth to 
output volatility in, but not before the Great Moderation. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
during the Great Moderation, borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors in excess of GDP growth 
moderated GDP fluctuations, which it did not before. 
We also study IRF analyses over 12 periods in Figures 4 and 5 and forecast error variance 
decomposition, separately for both subsamples in Figures 6 and 7. For ease of overview, we 
summarize the key findings in Tables 4 (IRFs) and 5 (variance decomposition analysis).15  
 
[Figure 4 HERE] 
[Figure 5 HERE] 
[Figure 6 HERE] 
[Figure 7 HERE] 
[Table 4 HERE] 
[Table 5 HERE] 
 
There are three significant effects in the IRFs. Most relevant to our hypothesis, we find that a one-
standard deviation shock in excess credit growth impacts negatively (with decreasing strength) on 
output volatility, after the second period. In line with this, the forecast error variance decomposition 
analysis shows that a substantial part of output growth volatility during the Great Moderation is 
attributable to excess credit growth, whereas almost nothing of it was explained by excess credit 
                                                           
15
 The decomposition of the forecast error variance of inflation and the federal funds rate are not reported in the table 
and the Figures. They are available on request. 
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growth before the Great Moderation. Conversely, inflation and the interest rate both explain 
substantial parts of output volatility before the Great Moderation and much less during the Great 
Moderation.16 This is consistent with the hypothesis that the rise in excess credit growth is among 
the causes of the Great Moderation change in output volatility. It is important to emphasize that the 
differences between pre- and during Great Moderation results may be due to either less excess 
credit growth or because the dependence of output volatility on excess credit growth was lower 
before the Great Moderation. 
We also run a counterfactual analysis where we take during-Great Moderation VAR parameter 
estimates and then apply these to pre-Great Moderation variables values, in order to compute output 
volatility forecast in each quarter. We contrast this to actual output volatility forecast during the 
Great Moderation. This exercise asks how much larger output growth volatility in the Great 
Moderation would have been, had the relations between excess credit growth and the other variables 
with output volatility not changed in the way it did.17 Figure 8 presents the results. 
 
[Figure 8 HERE] 
 
Figure 8 shows that output growth volatility is 0.88% in the counterfactual simulation, compared to 
the actual 0.57% average. This result suggests that actual output growth volatility was about one 
third lower than what it would have been, had the relations between excess credit growth and other 
variables with output growth volatility not changed in the way it did. This one-third reduction in 
output growth volatility compares to reported declines in the standard deviation of U.S. quarterly 
growth by about one half since 1984 (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Stock and Watson 2002). On this 
count, the counterfactual simulation results suggest that the present paper identifies a mechanism 




                                                           
16
 The results for variance decomposition and IRF remain qualitatively the same if we change the order of entering 
variables in the VAR. 
17
 Note that the outcome of this procedure should not be interpreted as strictly isolating the effect of excess credit 
growth on output volatility. The possible impacts, if any, of the other variables in the system on output volatility are 
included. That is, in the counterfactual simulation all parameter estimates (not just the excess credit parameter) have 
counterfactual (pre-Great Moderation) values, since the parameters are estimated in a system. But the Granger test and 
IRF results suggest that of the four variables, the changes in effect of excess credit on output volatility (both directly and 
through the other variables) were the most significant. 
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6. Summary, Discussion and Conclusions  
 
In the mid-1980s, two shifts occurred in the US economy. The first was that macroeconomic 
volatility declined strongly within a few years. This ‘Great Moderation’ lasted for more than two 
decades, until 2007. The second was that borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors increased strongly 
within a few years, to a level that was structurally above the level of growth. It remained high for 
over two decades, until 2007. Since access to credit may decrease output fluctuations, we 
hypothesize that during the Great Moderation borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors in excess of 
GDP growth moderated GDP fluctuations.  
No study to date has directly analyzed the link between output volatility during the Great 
Moderation and borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors. The effect of debt-financed wealth 
accumulation on volatility is different from the effect of debt-financed activity, which we analyze. 
A second contribution is that we observe not just credit flows (as most other studies do), but the 
growth in borrowing by the nonfinancial sectors in excess of output growth (or ‘excess credit 
growth’). Using flow-of-fund data, we focus on the indebtedness of the nonfinancial sectors. 
We show that excess credit growth was persistently positive during most of the Great 
Moderation, which it was not before. We test the hypothesis that this Granger-caused lower output 
volatility. We estimate univariate GARCH models in order to obtain estimates for the volatility of 
output growth. We use this obtained volatility in a VAR model with the volatility of output growth, 
excess credit and control variables (interest rate and inflation) over two periods, 1954-1978 (before 
the Great Moderation) and 1984-2008 (during the Great Moderation).  Results from Granger 
causality tests, impulse response functions, forecast error variance decompositions and a 
counterfactual simulation suggest that excess credit growth was Granger-causing the decline in 
output volatility during the Great Moderation, and that the magnitude of the effect on output 
volatility was non-negligible. 
As to the interpretation of these results, a focus on debt growth is one way to connect (as in 
Bean, 2011) the Great Moderation to the (2007) ‘Great Crash’ and the ‘Great Recession’ that 
followed. Bean (2011) discusses how low volatility in real and financial variables induced more 
debt-financed investment and risk taking than would otherwise have occurred in the decades 
preceding the Crash. This more cautionary view on credit growth also fits in with Minsky’s (1982) 
theory that ‘stability is destabilizing’, precisely because of the buildup in leverage that it 
encourages. Kemme and Roy (2012) show that the U.S. mortgage-driven house price boom was a 
15 
 
good predictor of the crisis. Cross-country empirical results point in the same direction. Akram and 
Eitrheim (2008) find that stabilization, not acceleration of credit growth enhances stability in both 
inflation and output in the long run. Arcand et al. (2012) find that there can be ‘too much finance’: 
above a threshold level of the credit-to-GDP ratio, the growth effect of credit declines and turns 
negative. Cecchetti et al. (2012) likewise conclude that beyond a certain level, debt is a drag on 
growth. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) find that a common denominator of financial crisis is a credit 
boom while Jorda et al. (2012) find that more credit-intensive expansions tend to be followed by 
deeper recessions and slower recoveries. Schularick and Taylor (2012) also analyze that financial 
crisis are ‘credit booms gone bust’. 
In line with these recent studies, this paper motivates a link between Moderation and Crash: 
perhaps there was a moderation of volatility partly due to immoderate credit growth not only in 
mortgage markets but also in the nonfinancial sectors. Such concerns arose around the same time 
that the structural decline in U.S. output volatility was first identified (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; 
Stock and Watson, 2002). Godley (1999) noted that the growth in U.S. private spending was 
structurally larger than the growth in private sector incomes since the early 1990s, and he wrote that 
“if … the growth in net lending and the growth in money supply growth were to continue for 
another eight years, the implied indebtedness of the private sector would then be so extremely large 
that a sensational day of reckoning could then be at hand.” (Godley, 1999:5). These observations, 
combined with the present study which measures the implied indebtedness of the private sector in 
the excess credit growth variable, may lead to a re-evaluation of the nature of the Great Moderation. 
16 
 
Appendix A: Data Construction 
 
We construct a measure for credit flows which finance activity in the nonfinancial sectors.  Since a 
large part of credit flows to the nonfinancial sectors are mortgages to households which do not 
finance activity but finance transactions in real estate assets, excluding mortgages is the most 
significant difference between our measure and other ‘credit to the private nonfinancial sectors’ 
measures used in the literature (e.g. Beck et al., 2000, updated in Beck et al., 2013). Obviously 
mortgages also play a role, albeit a different one, in understanding Great Moderation dynamics 
(Kemme and Roy, 2012; Grydaki and Bezemer, 2013), but they are not the focus of this paper. 
We utilize quarterly data from ‘Z’ tables in the Flow of Funds Accounts. Net credit to the 
nonfinancial sectors is the difference between stocks of credit market instruments held as assets and 
as liabilities by the nonfinancial sectors. They are recorded in series FL384004005.Q and 
FL394104005.Q in Z1, respectively. We subtract mortgage credit recorded in series 
FL383165005.Q, ‘domestic nonfinancial sectors; total mortgages; liability’. Apart from ‘credit 
market instruments’ nonfinancial-sectors activity is additionally financed by inter-firm trade credit 
(FL383070005.Q; see Mateut, 2005 on the role of trade credit), firm-to-customer consumer credit 
(FL383066005.Q) and ‘other loans and advances’ (FL383069005.Q). We add these credit stocks 
(which are quantitatively small relative to the credit market instruments stock). Finally, we subtract 




On the Links between Excess Credit Growth and Output Volatility 
 
In this Appendix we discuss two possible channels from excess credit growth to reduced output 
volatility. Every dollar borrowed by the nonfinancial sectors and spent on assets rather than on 
goods and services increases debt and financial wealth but not activity, in the first instance, and so 
helps understand the rise in excess credit (Figure 3). If this debt-financed net financial asset 
acquisition by the nonfinancial sectors occurs in countercyclical manner, this might stabilize GDP. 
There is extensive evidence (e.g. Krippner, 2005),  that during the Great Moderation nonfinancial 
firms or households increasingly realized their returns in financial transactions (for instance, by 
borrowing to finance stock repurchases realizing capital gains), which financed consumption or 
investment.18 
A second channel through which ‘excess credit growth’ may contribute to output stability is 
debt-financed spending on imports. This increases both imports and  consumption or investment. 
Since the rise in imports and the rise in consumption or investment cancel out in the national 
income definition, debt-financed spending on import does not directly  raise GDP but it does 
increase the debt/GDP ratio in a second-round effect, because of substantial spillover effects of 
imports on the transport and retail sectors and on activity generally (e.g. Acharya and Keller, 2008), 
debt-financed imports, if countercyclical to the business cycle, may induce additional activity that 
stabilizes GDP.  
In noting these links of asset acquisition and external balances with excess credit growth, 
nothing is implied about causality. Looser loan standards and low interest rates may have induced 
borrowing and consumption, leading to a rise in imports; or vice versa some external shock which 
decreased external balances may have induced more borrowing. A related paper by Fogli and Perri 
(2006) posits causality from external balances to lower incentives to accumulate precautionary 
savings, and an equilibrium permanent deterioration of external balances, consistent with our 
second channel. Explicitly testing for these causal relations is beset by pervasive endogeneities. It is 
                                                           
18
 Lazonick (2011) presents data on 373 companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 that were publicly listed in 
1990. He shows that they expended an annual average of $106.3 billion (or $285 million per company) on stock 
repurchases in 1995-1999, up from $25.9 billion in repurchases (or $69 million per company). This was equal to 44% of 
their combined net income (up from 23 percent of their combined net income in 1990-1994). Combined, the 500 
companies in the S&P 500 Index in January 2008 repurchased $489 billion of their own stock in 2006, representing 62 
percent of their net income, and $595 billion in 2007, representing 89 percent of their net income. Lazonick (2011) also 
notes the dramatic increase in stock repurchases after 2003, which may be linked to the upswing in excess credit after 
2003 observable in Figure 3. 
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not even implied that there is causality between excess credit flows to the nonfinancial sectors and 
the trade balance at this level: this can also be viewed as a macroeconomic identity (the current 
account deficit equals the capital account surplus). The same holds for excess credit growth and net 
asset acquisition. But to the extent that variations in output financed by excess credit growth 
(through either or both of these channels) are countercyclical to the business cycle, excess credit 
growth smooths GDP. This is what we test. 
19 
 
TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Mean Std dev. Skewness Kurtosis LM-Statistic 
      
1954Q3-1978Q4      
 
     
      
RGDP 0.0094 0.0109 -0.3512 3.5788 33.1762*** (12) 
      
INF 0.0097 0.0064 0.8570 3.5780 - 
      
EXCRED 0.0042 0.0380 -0.4203 7.5537 - 
      
FR 0.0232 0.1858 -1.1955 9.2076 - 
      
 
     
1984Q1-2008Q1      
 
     
RGDP 0.0076 0.0051 -0.1665 3.2697 3.5213* (1) 
      
INF 0.0063 0.0024 0.6443 2.7108 - 
      
EXCRED 0.0107 0.0352 -0.4955 2.8513 - 
      















Table 2: AR(p)-(A)Symmetric GARCH Models 
 
 AR(2)-GARCH(1,1) AR(2)-EGARCH(1,1) AR(2)-TGARCH(1,1) 
 
   


























   
Conditional Variance Equation 





















    
λ1  -0.1433 
(0.0587) 
 
    
γ1   0.2292 
(0.0849) 
Residual Diagnostics 




























    
SIC -6.7314 -6.7262 -6.7198 
 
Notes: Probability values are in parentheses. Q(p), Q2(p) reflect the Ljung-Box statistic for remaining autocorrelation  
and remaining ARCH effects, respectively; SIC is the value for Schwarz Information Criterion.
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     Table 3: Granger Causality Tests 
 
 









Testable Hypotheses Pre-Great Moderation During-Great Moderation 





 1954Q3-1978Q4 1984Q1-2008Q1 
   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   




   






Table 4: Excess credit growth and output volatility: impulse response functions 
 
Results from impulse response functions 
Before the Great Moderation During the Great Moderation 
 
 
change in interest rate (-) => output volatility excess credit growth (-) => output volatility 
 
excess credit growth (+) => change in interest rate 
 
inflation (+) => change in interest rate 
 
Note: In the table, x (-) => y denotes that a one-standard deviation shock in variable x impacts negatively on the change of variable y. 





Table 5:  Excess credit growth and output volatility: forecast error variance decomposition 
 
% of 12-quarters-ahead forecast error variance 
of output growth volatility explained by ... 
Before the Great Moderation During the Great Moderation 
 
 
excess credit growth:          0.15% excess credit growth:         18.15% 
change in interest rate:        8.77% change in interest rate:         5.91% 


















Figure 1: U.S. credit-to-GDP ratios (%), 1952Q1 – 2012Q1 
 
 
 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, flow of funds data (Z tables). 
 
 
Figure 2: Credit to the nonfinancial sectors and nominal GDP, 1952-2012 
 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analyis. Note: Data are growth rates (in percent) of nominal Dollar figures. In this graph  






Figure 3: Cumulative percentage point growth of “excess credit”, 1952-2008 
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Note: Counterfactual forecasts are constructed by applying during-Great Moderation VAR parameter estimates to pre-Great 
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